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CASE NOTES
No-Fault Insurance-SUBROGATION IN UNDERINSURED MOTORIST
SETTLEMENT PROCEEDINGS--Schmtdt v. Clothizer, 338 N.W.2d 256 (Minn.
1983).
In Minnesota, as in the majority of no-fault automobile insurance ju-
risdictions,l an injured person's attempt to receive compensation from
his insurer is often fraught with conflict. This conflict between insureds
and insurers is highly visible in the area of liability insurance settlement
proceedings.2 When an underinsured motorist is involved in settlement
proceedings, the conflicts stem from uncertainty concerning the rights
and duties of the parties involved. One method of balancing the rights of
insureds and the equitable distribution of the insurance burden among
insurers and noncontributors to the no-fault system is through
1. Twenty-five states have enacted no-fault automobile insurance legislation. See
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-4014 to -4021 (1980 & Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 10-4-
701 to -723 (1973 & Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-319 to -351 (West Supp.
1983-1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 3902 (1975 & Supp. 1982); id tit. 21, § 2118 (1979
& Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, §§ 627.730 to 627.7405 (1984); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 33-34-1 to -13 (1982 & Supp. 1984); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 294-1 to -41 (1976 & Supp.
1981); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, §§ 1065.150-.163 (1971), repealed by P.A. 78-1297, § 22 (ef-
fective March 4, 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-3101 to -3121 (1981 & Supp. 1983); Ky.
REV. STAT. §§ 304.39-010 to -340 (1981 & Supp. 1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 538-
547A (1979 & Supp. 1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, §§ 34A-340 (West 1969 &
Supp. 1984-1985); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 500.3101-.3179 (West 1983); MINN. STAT.
§§ 65B.41-.71 (1982 & Supp. 1983); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 698.010-.510, repealed by law of
June 5, 1979, ch. 660, 1979 Nev. Stat. 1513, 1519; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:6A-I to -35 (West
1973 & Supp. 1984-1985); N.Y. INS. LAw §§ 670-678 (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 26-41-01 to -19 (1978 & Sirpp. 1983); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 743.786-.835
(1983); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1009.101-.701 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985); S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 56-11-10 to -800 (Law. Co-op 1977 & Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. §§ 58-23-6 to -8 (1978); TEx. INS. CODE ANN. § 5.06-3 (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1984);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 31-41-1 to -13 (1974 & Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 38.1-380.1 to -381.8
(1981 & Supp. 1982).
2. See 11 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 5128 (1981) (conflict in
area of subrogation); 16 G. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 61:183 (2d ed. 1983); P.
PRETZEL, UNINSURED MOTORISTS § 60 (1972); see enerally Gallagher & German, Resolu-
tion of Settlement Conficls Among Insureds, Primary Insurers, and Excess Insurers. Analysts of the
Current State of the Law and Suggested Guidelinesfor the Future, 61 NEB. L. REV. 284 (1982)
(conflict in area of liability coverage).
This conflict is particularly acute in the area of subrogation and underinsurance set-
tlements. See generally Hentemann, Underinsured Motonst Coverage," A New Coverage With New
Problems, 50 INS. COUNS. J. 365, 371 (1983); Comment, Washington's Underinsured Motorist
Statute. Balancing the Interests oInsurers and Insureds, 55 WASH. L. REv. 819, 829 (1980).
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subrogation.3
Subrogation allows an insurer to be placed in the position of its in-
sured in order to pursue recovery from third parties legally responsible to
the insured for a loss paid by the insurer.4 The issue of when, if at all, an
underinsurer is subrogated to the claim of its insured when the insured
settles with an underinsured tortfeasor has challenged the Minnesota
Supreme Court's ability to balance the competing purposes of the No-
Fault Act.
5
In the recent case of Schmidt v. Clolth'er6 the Minnesota Supreme Court
at least partially resolved some of these uncertainties. The court held in
Schmidt that the underinsurer must pay only the plaintiffs' damages
which exceed the liability limits of the tortfeasor's policies. 7 Thus, the
possibility of a "gap" between the settlement offer and the tortfeasor's
residual liability limits, which would not be recoverable from the under-
insurer, is created.8
3. See generall Steenson, A Primer on Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance, 7 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 313, 392-96 (discussion of subrogation under the Minnesota No-Fault
Act).
4. See 16 G. COUcH, supra note 2, § 61:1, at 75.
5. MINN. STAT. § 65B.42 (1982) sets forth the purposes of the act as follows:
(a) To relieve the severe economic distress of uncompensated victims of au-
tomobile accidents within this state by requiring automobile insurers to offer and
automobile owners to maintain automobile insurance policies or other pledges of
indemnity which will provide prompt payment of specified basic economic loss
benefits to victims of automobile accidents without regard to whose fault caused
the accident;
(b) To prevent the overcompensation of those automobile accident victims
suffering minor injuries by restricting the right to recover general damages to
cases of serious injury;
(c) To encourage appropriate medical and rehabilitation treatment of the
automobile accident victim by assuring prompt payment for such treatment;
(d) To speed the administration of justice, to ease the burden of litigation
on the courts of this state, and to create a system of small claims arbitration to
decrease the expense of and to simplify litigation, and to create a system of
mandatory inter-company arbitration to assure a prompt and proper allocation
of the costs of insurance benefits between motor vehicle insurers;
(e) To correct imbalances and abuses in the operation of the automobile
accident tort liability system, to provide offsets to avoid duplicate recovery, to
require medical examination and disclosure, and to govern the effect of advance
payments prior to final settlement of liability.
Id
6. 338 N.W.2d 256 (Minn. 1983).
7. Id at 261; see intfra note 49 and accompanying text.
8. 338 N.W.2d at 261. But see Abberton v. Colonial Penn. Ins. Co., 421 So. 2d 6 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (under Florida statute, insured can settle with tortfeasor's insurer for
less than the maximum liability coverage without jeopardizing recovery under his own
underinsurance provision); see also United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Gordon, 359 So.
2d 480 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (Florida statute does not require insured to exhaust all
other sources of recovery before seeking coverage under his own underinsured motorist
coverage); Arrieta v. Volkswagen Ins. Co., 343 So. 2d 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (in-
jured plaintiff may compel arbitration upon his own underinsured motorist insurance
company prior to bringing an action against the tortfeasor).
[Vol. I11
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The court also held that the underinsurer has no right to the proceeds
of its injured insured's settlement with the tortfeasor.9 The underinsurer,
however, may preserve its right of subrogation against the tortfeasor.O
In order to preserve its subrogation right, the underinsurer must either
pay underinsurance benefits prior to agreement on the settlement
amount, or substitute its own check for the settlement amount.II
The Schmidt decision is significant because it offers the Minnesota
Supreme Court's solution to the problem of preserving an underinsurer's
subrogation rights and the insured's right to recovery during settlement
proceedings. 12 The solution comports with the policies of the No-Fault
Act by encouraging the prompt payment of underinsurance benefits.1
3
The solution also preserves the underinsurer's subrogation rights before
the insured is fully compensated, yet limits the right of subrogation to
those instances in which benefits are paid before the insured settles with
the tortfeasor. 14
The common law rule regarding an insured's settlement with third
parties clearly favored the insurer.15 The rule provided that the insured
forfeited his right to insurance benefits by settling without the insurer's
prior consent.16 The rule was justified on the grounds that the settlement
destroyed the insurer's subrogation right. 17 Some jurisdictions, however,
have allowed an insured to recover from the insurer where the scope of
9. See 338 N.W.2d at 262. Since the underinsurer must pay only those damages in
excess of the tortfeasor's residual liability coverage, there is no possibility of double recov-
ery by the injured insured. See id at 261.
10. Id. at 262-63.
11. Id. at 263. In Schmidt's situation, where the damages were substantially more
than the tortfeasor's liability limits and the tortfeasor had substantial assets, Safeco should
have substituted a $100,000 payment (the amount of the tortfeasor's coverage limit) to
Schmidt. Id
12. See nfta note 48 and accompanying text.
13. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
14. See 338 N.W.2d at 262-63.
15. The general reason given for the common law rule was that it allowed complete
freedom of contract and enforced the expressed intentions of the parties. See R. KEETON,
supra note 7, at 153.
16. See 6A J. APPLEMAN, supra note 2, § 4093, at 253; A. WIDISS, A GUIDE TO UNIN-
SURED MOTORIST COVERAGE § 5.7 (1969 & Supp. 1981); see, e.g., Lopez v. Fidelity &
Casualty Co., 412 So. 2d 395 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Stanko v. Hartford Indem. Co.,
397 A.2d 1325 (R.I. 1979); Hart v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 455 So. 2d 710 (Tenn.
App. 1982); Foundation Reserve Ins. Co. v. Cody, 458 S.W.2d 214, 216 (Tex. Civ. App.
1970). Seegenerally Hentleman, supra note 2, at 371 (discussing the consequences of subro-
gation and settlement).
17. The rationale for the rule has been that by releasing the tortfeasor the insured has
destroyed the insurer's right to subrogation. See 6A J. APPLEMAN, supra note 2, § 4092, at
239; accordGreat N. Oil Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 291 Minn. 97, 189 N.W.2d
404 (1971). The Great N. court stated that settling with the tortfeasor after loss but before
payment of the insured destroyed the insurer's right to subrogate. Id. at 99-100, 189
N.W.2d at 406-07; see also Bacich v. Homeland Ins. Co. of Am., 212 Minn. 375, 3 N.W.2d
19851
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the release was somewhat limited or restricted.18 Other jurisdictions
have allowed recovery where the settlement has not prejudiced the
insurer. 19
Prior to the enactment of no-fault legislation,20 Minnesota adhered to
the common law rule which required the insured to receive the insurer's
consent to settlement.21 Recent state district court decisions, however,
have not required consent as a condition for claiming underinsured mo-
torist benefits.22
In Minnesota, underinsured motorist insurance coverage allows cover-
age for uncompensated damages which the injured insured is legally en-
titled to recover because his damages exceed the liability limits of the
policy covering the other involved vehicle.23 Underinsurance coverage
allows the insurer subrogation rights against the tortfeasor upon pay-
665 (1942) (insured's settlement with wrongdoer destroyed insurer's duty to pay the loss
since the insurer could no longer be subrogated to the insured after the settlement).
The insurer merely "steps into the shoes" of the insured and is entitled to rights not
greater than those possessed by the insured. Great N OilCo., 291 Minn. at 99, 189 N.W.2d
at 406; Employers Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Morse, 261 Minn. 259, 263, 111 N.W.2d 620,
624 (1961). Subrogation claims, by their nature, are derivative, and amount to no more
than the rights originally held by the insured. St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Horace Mann Ins. Co.,
231 N.W.2d 619, 625 (Iowa 1975); Worobec v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 200 Neb.
210, 214, 263 N.W.2d 95, 98 (1978).
18. See, e.g., Sanford v. Richardson, 252 So. 2d 922, 925-26 (La. Ct. App. 1971); Wal-
lace v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 256 S.C. 313, 182 S.E.2d 84 (1971); cf Cingoranelli v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 658 P.2d 863 (Colo. 1983). In Cingorane/li, a passenger in an
automobile accident brought an action against her driver to recover for personal injuries.
Id at 864. The passenger had executed two general releases in favor of the vehicle and the
driver of the other vehicle involved in the accident. Id at 863. The court held that be-
cause the releases did not specifically mention personal injury protection (PIP), the re-
leases failed to relieve the tortfeasor's PIP carrier from obligations to pay PIP benefits. Id
at 869.
19. See, e.g., Thiringer v. American Motor Ins. Co., 91 Wash. 2d 215, 216, 588 P.2d
191, 193 (1978) (where insured settled with tortfeasor for amount less than his damages,
but the settlement exhausted all of tortfeasor's present and future funds, then insurer is not
prejudiced); cf Porter v. Travelers Indem. Co., 313 So. 2d 641, 644 (La. 1975) (insurer not
prejudiced because it had induced defendants to settle).
20. The Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act became effective on January
1, 1975. Act of Apr. 11, 1974, ch. 408, § 35, 1974 Minn. Laws 762, 786 (current version at
MINN. STAT. §§ 65B.41-.71 (1982 & Supp. 1983)).
21. See Bacich v. Homeland Ins. Co. of Am., 212 Minn. 375, 376, 3 N.W.2d 665, 666
(1942) (holding that release of tortfeasor by insured barred recovery under insured's cover-
age); see also Repo v. Capital Elevator Co., 312 Minn. 364, 366, 252 N.W.2d 248, 250
(1977) (injured employee who settled with workers' compensation carrier denied claim to
disability benefits under group sickness and accident policy).
22. See Royer v. Maryland Casualty Co., Civ. No. 5-78-27 (D. Minn. Feb. 21, 1979);
Nelson v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., Civ. No. 3-80368 (D. Minn. Mar. 20, 1981).
23. Although the requirement that insurers offer underinsurance to all policyholders
has been repealed, see MINN. STAT. § 65B.49, subd. 6(e) (1978), repealed by Act of Apr. 11,
1980, ch. 539, § 7, 1980 Minn. Laws 700-01, underinsurance remains available by con-
tract. See also Steenson, supra note 8, at 149-52.
[Vol. I11
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ment of underinsured motorist benefits.24
Although subrogation interests are protected by both statutory and
contractual provisions, the concept of subrogation is based in equity.25
Accordingly, in a subrogation action, equitable principles are applied to
shift the loss for which the insurer has compensated its insured to the
tortfeasor who actually caused the loss.26 Pursuant to these principles of
equity, subrogation will not be invoked to work injustice or to defeat
superior equities of others.2 7 In Minnesota, the insurer's right to subro-
24. See Act of May 25, 1977, ch. 266, § 3, 1977 Minn. Laws 438 (codified at MINN.
STAT. § 65B.49, subd. 6 (repealed 1980)) which provided:
Reparation obligors shall offer the following optional coverages in addition to
compulsory coverages:
Underinsured motorist coverage offered in an amount at least equal to the in-
sured's residual liability limits and also at lower limits which the insured may
select, whereby the reparation obligor agrees to pay damages the insured is le-
gally entitled to recover on account of a motor vehicle accident but which are
uncompensated because the total damages exceed the residual liability limit of
the owner of the other vehicle. The reparation obl/ior is subrogated to any amounts it
pays and upon payment has an assignment of the judgment if any against the
other person to the extent of the money it pays ....
Id. (emphasis added).
The underinsured motorist provision of the No-Fault Act was repealed in 1980. See
Act of Apr. 11, 1980, ch. 539, § 7, 1980 Minn. Laws 700-701.
25. See Westendorf v. Stasson, 330 N.W.2d 699, 703 (Minn. 1983) ("even when the
right to subrogation arises by virtue of an agreement, the terms of the subrogation will
nonetheless be governed by equitable principles, unless the agreement clearly and explic-
itly provides to the contrary"); Great N. Oil Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 291
Minn. 97, 99, 189 N.W.2d 404 (1971) (subrogation is determined by "the nature of the
contract of insurance and on general principles of equity"); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co.
v. Reed Cleaners, 265 Minn. 503, 510, 122 N.W.2d 178, 182 (1963) ("statutory subroga-
tion has the same characteristics as if it were a creature of equity"); Northern Trust Co. v.
Consolidated Elevator Co., 142 Minn. 132, 138, 171 N.W. 265, 268 (1919) ("subrogation is
of purely equitable origin and nature"). Subrogation is "founded upon the relationship of
the parties and upon equitable principles, for the purpose of accomplishing the substantial
ends of justice. Subrogation rests on the maxim that no one should be enriched by an-
other's loss." 6A J. APPLEMAN, supra note 2, § 4054, at 142-43 (footnotes omitted); see
Bacich v. Homeland Ins. Co. of Am., 212 Minn. 375, 376, 3 N.W.2d 665, 665 (1942)
(subrogation depends upon "general principles of equity and the nature of the contract of
insurance"). See generally 16 G. COUCH, supra note 2, § 61.20 (discussing the equitable
nature of subrogation).
26. See 6A J. APPLEMAN, supra note 2, § 4054, at 143-44; 16 G. COUCH, supra note 2,
§ 61:20, at 98. For examples of this shifting of the loss, see Northern Trust Co., 142 Minn. at
138, 171 N.W. at 268 ("the object of subrogation is to place the charge where it ought to
rest by compelling the payment of the debt by him who ought in equity to pay it");
Westendorf 330 N.W.2d at 703 (subrogation has restitutionary purpose of preventing un-
just enrichment).
27. See 11 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 2, § 6502, at 434-35; 16 G. COUCH, supra note 2,
§ 61:21, at 99; see also H. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY
§ 123, at 333 (2d ed. 1948) (subrogation rights not enforced to detriment of rights of
others). See generally Topical Survey, Subrogation-Insurer's Right of Subrogation Does Not Arise
Until Insured Fully Recovers Loss, 16 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 482, 482 (1982) (courts refuse to
enforce subrogation where it prejudices equitable rights of others).
19851
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gation is conditionally based on the following factors: (1) payment by
the subrogating insurer to its insured; 28 (2) receipt by the insured of full
compensation, from all sources, for his injuries;29 and (3) avoidance of
double recovery by the insured. 30
Schmidt was a consolidated action brought by plaintiffs Rosemarie
Schmidt and Edward Paskoff, who sought to recover underinsurance
benefits from Safeco Insurance Company (Safeco).3 1 Both Schmidt and
Paskoff were injured in separate automobile accidents and were offered
settlements by the tortfeasors' liability insurers in exchange for full re-
leases.32 Schmidt settled for the tortfeasor's policy limits, while Paskoff
negotiated a combined settlement which was below the policy limits of
the respective tortfeasors.33 Schmidt and Paskoff notified Safeco of their
intent to accept the settlements and sought Safeco's consent to the settle-
ments. 34 Safeco, relying on its contractual provisions35 and its claimed
28. The requirement of payment is consistent with MINN. STAT. § 65B.49, subd. 6(e)
(repealed 1980), which provided subrogation for any "amounts [the insurer] pays and
upon payment has an assignment of the judgment if any against the other person to the
extent of the money it pays." Id; see also supra note 24 and accompanying text.
29. See Westendorf, 330 N.W.2d at 703 ("absent express contract terms to the contrary,
subrogation will not be allowed where the insured's total recovery is less than the insured's
actual loss"); Pfeffer v. State Auto. & Casualty Underwriters Ins. Co., 292 N.W.2d 743,
744 (Minn. 1980) (subrogation is not permitted even where the insurer has paid out full
benefits if the total amount received from all sources did not fully compensate the in-
sured). The Pfeffer court relied on the No-Fault Act's intent to "relieve the severe eco-
nomic distress of uncompensated victims of automobile accidents .... ." Id at 747
(quoting MINN. STAT. § 65B.42(l) (1978)). Prior to the Act, full compensation of the
insured was a precondition to the insurer's subrogation. See Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Kluver, 302 Minn. 310, 225 N.W.2d 230 (1974).
30. See Pfeffr, 292 N.W.2d at 746-47. The No-Fault Act permits subrogation by a
reparation obligor to the extent that the insured will receive a duplicate recovery. MINN.
STAT. § 65B.42, subd. 5 (1982); see Flanery v. Total Tree, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 642 (Minn.
1983); Bartel v. New Haven Township, 323 N.W.2d 806 (Minn. 1982).
31. 338 N.W.2d at 259. Schmidt's damages exceeded $265,000. Id The tortfeasor's
liability coverage was $100,000 and Mrs. Schmidt carried $100,000 of underinsurance cov-
erage with Safeco. Since Schmidt's damages were more than the tortfeasor's liability cov-
erage, she sought compensation from Safeco. Id
32. Id Schmidt's husband was struck and killed by a truck driven by defendant
Clothier. Id. The tortfeasor's insurer, St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, of-
fered Schmidt $100,000, the maximum payable under Clothier's liability coverage. Id
Paskoff was injured while a passenger in a car driven by Linda Epperly and owned by
Minneapolis Special School District No. 1. Id Epperly's car collided with a car driven
and owned by Gerald Hoag. Id Paskoff received a settlement offer by Hoag of $22,000
on Hoag's $25,000 liability policy and an offer by Epperly of $4,000 on the school district's
$300,000 liability policy. Id
33. 338 N.W.2d at 259.
34. Id
35. See zn/a note 49. The following is an example of a consent clause: "This policy
does not apply . . .(b) to bodily injury to an insured with respect to which such insured
. ..shall, without written consent of the company, make any settlement with any person
[Vol. I11
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subrogation right, refused to consent to either settlement.36
. In response to Safeco's refusal, Schmidt and Paskoff filed complaints in
district court requesting approval by the court of their acceptance of the
defendants' settlement offers. The district court granted orders authoriz-
ing them to execute general releases and to accept the settlements.37 The
orders to execute the releases were stayed ten days3 8 to allow Safeco the
opportunity to tender checks for the amount of each plaintiff's settle-
ment. 39 These checks, if tendered, would have protected Safeco's subro-
gation interests against any of the defendants.40 In both cases, Safeco
appealed the order and refused to process the underinsurance claims, re-
lying on contractual provisions and its claimed subrogation interest.41
In denying Paskoffs recovery for the "gap" between the settlement
offer and the tortfeasors' residual liability policy limits, the supreme
court relied on the underinsurance provision of the No-Fault Act in effect
at that time.42 The court found that the language of the statute clearly
or organization who may be legally liable .... ." Respondent Paskoff's Brief at A26,
Schmidt v. Clothier, 338 N.W.2d 256 (Minn. 1983).
Safeco Insurance Company, the underinsurance carrier in Schmidt, had the following
provisions in its policies: "The insured shall cooperate with Safeco and upon Safeco's
request, assist in making settlements .... " Another provision is entitled:
5. Our right to recover payment
(a) If we make a payment under this policy and the person to or from
whom payment was made has the right to recover damages from another we
shall have that right. That person shall do whatever is necessary to exercise our
rights and shall do nothing after loss to prejudice them.
(b) If we make payment under this policy and the person to or from whom
payment is made recovers damages from another, that person shall hold in trust
for us the proceeds of recovery and shall reimburse us to the extent of our
payment.
Appellant's Brief (Paskoff action) at A3, Schmidt v. Clothier, 338 N.W.2d 256 (Minn.
1983).
36. 338 N.W.2d at 259. Schmidt then demanded arbitration of her claim, but Safeco
refused. Id. After Schmidt threatened to file a bad faith lawsuit, Safeco tendered a check
for $100,000. Id In exchange for the check, however, Schmidt was required to hold any
recovery she obtained in trust for Safeco. Id Schmidt was also required to fully release
Safeco from any claim she might make. Id Schmidt's counsel claimed Safeco had "cho-
sen to continuously dodge its obligations to its insured and it attempts to cover its malfea-
sance with a smoke screen of counterfeit 'issues,' all fabricated to protect an alleged
subrogation right ...... Respondent Schmidt's Brief at 7, Schmidt v. Clothier, 338
N.W.2d 256 (Minn. 1983).
37. 338 N.W.2d at 259-60. Id Schmidt's order also directed Safeco to either pay
Schmidt her underinsurance benefits or to submit the matter to arbitration within 10
days. Id at 259.
38. Id. at 259-60. The Schmidt court extended the period for the insurer to tender a
check from 10 to 30 days beginning at the time the insurer receives written notice of the
tentative settlement from the insured. Id at 263.
39. Id at 259-60, 263.
40. Id at 259-60.
41. Id; see also infra notes 35, 49.
42. Id at 261; seMINN. STAT. § 65B.49, subd. 6(e) (repealed 1980). While the court's
reliance on the statute is helpful in deciding Schmidt, for accidents after 1980, the statute
1985]
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indicated that underinsurance benefits were available for damages that
were uncompensated because the tortfeasor carried inadequate liability
insurance. 43 Thus, damages that are uncompensated because the injured
insured settles for less than the tortfeasor's liability limits remain uncom-
pensated.44 Based on this reasoning, Paskoff was denied recovery for the
difference between his settlement with the tortfeasor and the tortfeasor's
liability insurance carrier's policy limit. 4 5
The court further reasoned that the insured would have no incentive
to negotiate the best possible settlement with the tortfeasor if the insured
could look to the underinsurer to pay the "gap."46 The court concluded
that such a result would be contrary to the parties' agreement and would
place the underinsurer in an unfair situation in which it would have no
control over the settlement of the case, yet would be required to pay the
difference between the settlement amount and the tortfeasor's liability
policy limits.
4 7
The Schmidt court also adopted a prospective procedure which allows
the underinsurer to preserve its subrogation right.4 8 Under this proce-
provides no guidance. The court does provide additional support for its decision to deny
recovery for the "gap." The court stated, "Practically, the insured would have no incen-
tive to obtain the best settlement if he or she is assured of recovering the 'gap' from the
underinsurer." Id at 261.
43. 338 N.W.2d at 261. This statute appears to define underinsured. See MINN.
STAT. § 65B.49, subd. 6(e) (repealed 1980). The statute does not discuss settlement or the
intended effect of settlement on recovery of benefits. See id
44. 338 N.W.2d at 261.
45. Id at 263-64.
46. Id at 261.
47. Id The same arguments could be made regarding uninsured motorist coverage,
yet in those cases the court has reached an opposite result. See Taylor v. Great Cent. Ins.
Co., 305 Minn. 446, 234 N.W.2d 590 (1975). The plaintiff in Taylor was injured in a three-
car accident while a passenger in one of the cars. The plaintiff settled with one of the
drivers and, because the other driver was uninsured, sought recovery of uninsured motor-
ist benefits. The insurer attempted to set off benefits by the amount of plaintiffs recovery
from the other driver. In not allowing the set-off, the court noted a prior decision stating
that: "If the purpose of the statute is to be fulfilled, the injured party is entitled to the
proceeds of his uninsured motorist coverage within the limits of his own policy coverage
free from any reductions which would not be available in a suit against an insured
tortfeasor." Id. at 449, 234 N.W.2d at 591 (quoting Brunmeier v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 296
Minn. 328, 336, 208 N.W.2d 860, 865 (1973)); see also Pleitgen v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 296
Minn. 191, 207 N.W.2d 535 (1973) (insurance policy provisions that limit uninsured mo-
torist insurance coverage when more than one policy applies are repugnant to statute);
Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 181, 207 N.W.2d 348 (1973) (re-
ceipt of medical expense insurance benefits does not preclude payment of uninsured mo-
torist insurance).
48. The parties, as well as two amici, the Minnesota Trial Lawyers Association and
the Minnesota Defense Lawyers Association, requested the court to formulate a rule set-
ting forth the rights and duties of the insured, the 'underinsurer, the liability insurer, and
the tortfeasor. 338 N.W.2d at 260. The court acknowledged the significance of the case:
"These consolidated cases raise important questions of insurance law in the context of
underinsurance coverage, settlements, and subrogation rights." Id at 259. Confusion in
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dure, the underinsurer is entitled to written notice of its insured's tenta-
tive settlement agreement and has thirty days after receiving notice to
either acquiesce in the settlement agreement and lose potential subroga-
these areas is partially the result of exclusions and conditions in insurance contracts.
Royer v. Maryland Gas Co., No. 5-78-27 (D. Minn. Feb. 21, 1979).
Professor Keeton separates the various jurisdictions' approaches to apportioning
rights and obligations into five rules: (1) "The insurer is the sole beneficial owner of the
claim against the third party and is entitled to the full amount recovered, whether or not
it exceeds the amount paid by the insurer to the insured." R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON
INSURANCE LAW 160-61 (1971). (2) "The insurer is to be reimbursed first out of the recov-
ery from the third party, and the insured is entitled to any remaining balance." Id at 161.
(3) "The recovery from the third person is prorated between the insurer and the insured,
in accordance with the percentage of the original loss for which the insurer paid the in-
sured under the policy." Id (4) "Out of the recovery from the third party, the insured is
to be reimbursed first, for the loss not compensated by insurance, and the insurer is enti-
tled to any remaining balance, up to a sum sufficient to reimburse the insurer fully, the
insured being entitled to anything beyond that." Id (5) "The insured is the sole owner of
the claim against the third party and is entitled to the the full amount recovered, whether
or not the total thus received . . . exceeds his loss." Id at 162.
The fourth rule has the greatest precedential support. Id at 164. Minnesota has
adopted the fourth rule. See Pfeffer v. State Auto. & Casualty Underwriters Ins. Co., 292
N.W.2d 743 (Minn. 1980). In Pfeffer, an injured party's no-fault insurer, which had paid
benefits, claimed a subrogation right in a settlement the insured made with the third-party
tortfeasor. Id at 745. The court held that the no-fault insurer was not entitled to subroga-
tion to proceeds from a settlement made by its insured with a third-party tortfeasor, where
the insured had not been fully compensated for his injury. Id at 749. In Milbank Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Kluver, 302 Minn. 310, 225 N.W.2d 230 (1974), the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that an uninsured motorist carrier was not entitled to subrogation interest in a dram
shop settlement where the injured insured had not been fully compensated. Id. at 315, 225
N.W.2d at 233. In Westendorf v. Stasson, 330 N.W.2d 699, 701, 703-04 (Minn. 1983), the
subrogation right of a health maintenance organization, which had paid plaintiff's medi-
cal expenses, to the proceeds of a settlement agreement between the plaintiff and the
third-party tortfeasor was held not to arise even where the third-party tortfeasor's insurer
had paid out the policy limits if the total amount received from all sources did not fully
compensate the plaintiff.
An example of Keeton's first category is found in Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Brass Goods
Mfg. Co., 239 N.Y. 273, 146 N.E. 377 (1925) (where insurance carrier paid award under
workers' compensation law, and took assignment of cause of action against third person,
carrier held entitled to recover amount assignors might have recovered and not merely
amount of award). A Texas case falls within the second category. See Fort Worth Lloyds
v. Haygood, 151 Tex. 149, 246 S.W.2d 865 (1952) (where employee sued third-party
tortfeasor after having been paid workers' compensation insurance, compensation carrier
is entitled to reimbursement for compensation paid). Examples of proration under the
third category are found in Pontiac Mut. County Fire & Lightning Ins. Co. v. Sheibley,
279 Ill. 118, 116 N.E. 644 (1917) (where fire insurance company paid policy limits for barn
destroyed by fire, and subsequently cooperated with insured in suing railroad company for
setting fire and, while case was pending on appeal, settled for amount less than judgment
in trial court, insurer entitled to recover prorated share of settlement based on percentage
of trial court judgment paid by insurer to insured), and General Exch. Ins. Corp. v. Dris-
coil, 315 Mass. 360, 52 N.E.2d 970 (1944) (where insurer paid insured for damage to auto-
mobile and plaintiff subsequently brought suit and recovered from third-party tortfeasor
for both personal injuries and property damage, insurer is subrogated to that portion of
damages attributable to property damage claim).
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tion rights, or prevent settlement by substituting the settlement draft ten-
dered by the liability insurer with its own draft.49
In adopting this procedure, the Schmidt court reasoned that by receiv-
ing notice of the settlement agreement, the underinsurer would be in a
better position to assess the value of the case. 50 The underinsurer would
have sufficient time to evaluate factors such as the adequacy of the settle-
ment amount, the remaining amounts of liability insurance, and the
costs and risks associated with litigating the case.SI If an underinsurer
determined that recovery of underinsurance benefits it paid was unlikely,
49. See 338 N.W.2d at 262. In Schmidt, the court also considered the enforceability of
exhaustion clauses and the insured's coverage when obtaining a settlement below the
tortfeasor's liability limit. Id at 260-62. The exhaustion clauses provided: "We will pay
under this coverage only after the limits of liability under any applicable bodily injury
liability bonds or policies have been exhausted by payments of judgments or settlements."
Id at 260. The court held that such clauses, which force insureds to litigate claims in
order to exhaust policy limits, are void as against the purpose of the Minnesota No-Fault
Automobile Insurance Act, MINN. STAT. § 65B.41-.71 (1982 & Supp. 1983). 338 N.W.2d
at 260. Ultimately, the exhaustion clauses lessen the insured's net recovery, delay pay-
ment and burden the court system. Id.
The court's position is consistent with conclusions reached by Minnesota state and
federal district courts. See, e.g., Nelson v. United States Fidelity & Guar, Co., Civ. No. 3-
80-368 (D. Minn. Mar. 20, 1981); Boulton v. Dairyland Ins. Co., No. 768522 (Hennepin
County Dist. Ct. Jan. 15, 1981); Franke v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 756530 (Hennepin County
Dist. Ct. June 23, 1980); see also Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Reyer, 362 So. 2d 390 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1978); M. STEENSON, MINNESOTA NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 150
(1982) ("Courts have held that settlement of the third-party claim does not foreclose a
claim for underinsured motorist coverage").
The Schmidt court also held that the insured cannot "obtain a below-limit settlement
from the tortfeasor and then recoup the 'gap' from the underinsurance carrier." 338
N.W.2d at 261. The court interpreted the statutory provisions in effect at the time the
causes of action arose to provide coverage in excess of the tortfeasor's liability limit and
not to provide coverage where the insured has chosen to settle below the tortfeasor's liabil-
ity limits. ld; .see also Act of May 27, 1977, ch. 276, § 3, 1977 Minn. Laws 474, 476 (cur-
rent version at MINN. STAT. § 65B.44, subd. 6(e) (1982)). The underinsurer's liability
depends on the ascertainable liability limit of the tortfeasor rather than on the settlement.
Id, see also United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 369 So.
2d 410 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
Other jurisdictions have also concluded that an insured may not obtain a below-limit
settlement and then recover the difference from the underinsurance carrier. See Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Riverside Ins. Co. of Am., 509 F. Supp. 43 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (excess insurer's
liability limited to the extent that the value of plaintiff's claim exceeded the underin-
surance coverage); Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Long, 387 So. 2d 976 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1980) (arbitration award must first be reduced by the tortfeasor's $15,000 liability
coverage, despite the fact that no payment had been made by the tortfeasor).
Justice Todd wrote a dissenting opinion regarding the problem of the insured settling
for less than the tortfeasor's liability, with Chief Justice Amdahl and Justice Scott concur-
ring in the dissent. 338 N.W.2d at 264 (Todd, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion
would have made the underinsurer compensate the insured for the difference between
settlement and the tortfeasor's liability limit. Id
50. See 338 N.W.2d at 263.
51. Id
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the underinsurer could approve the settlement and release by not acting
within the thirty-day period.52
The Schmidt court reasoned that the procedure adopted would also
protect the underinsurer if a tortfeasor had substantial assets and dam-
ages exceeded the tortfeasor's liability limits. 53 In this situation, the un-
derinsurer would be allowed to protect its subrogation rights by
substituting payment in an amount equal to the proposed settlement of-
fer.54 By tendering its substitute payment, the underinsurer would pro-
tect its corresponding subrogation right and the insured would receive
the amount of the settlement in cash.55
Justice Todd, in a concurring and dissenting opinion, agreed with the
subrogation procedures established by the majority.56 Justice Todd dis-
sented on the "gap" issue, however, stating that the injured insured
should not have to take a loss by settling his claim.57 Instead, the check
substitution procedure should be used if the underinsurer wishes to pre-
serve its subrogation right.58 By complying with this procedure, the in-
jured party would be able to negotiate the best possible settlement, while
not being forced to accept a lower settlement offer in order to expedite
his total claim.59
Although the Schmidt decision is beneficial in many respects, the court
failed to entirely reconcile the underinsurance settlement conflict. The
court could have explicitly invalidated insurance policy clauses requiring
the insurer's consent prior to settlement.60 Consent to settle clauses have
been struck down when they served to abridge the statutory rights of the
policy holders. 6 1 As a result of Safeco's refusal to give consent, both
52. Id.
53. Se id
54. Id. At the subsequent arbitration proceeding the underinsurer has the choice of
whether to pursue negotiations toward a higher settlement, or commence trial proceedings
in its insured's name. Id.
55. Ste id
56. See 338 N.W.2d at 264.
57. Id
58. Justice Todd specified that the injured insured should negotiate the best possible
settlement. Id The offer would then be communicated to the underinsurer. Id If the
underinsurer wished to preserve its subrogation right, the offer would be matched by the
underinsurer. Id The entire balance would then be arbitrated. See i. Presumably, the
underinsured would then recover the "gap" via subrogation.
59. See id
60. Arguably, the presence of such clauses might be raised as a defense to underin-
surance claims. Contract stipulations which are not in accord with public policy or statu-
tory provisions are invalid. See 1 G. COUCH, supra note 2, § 13:7. Exclusions and
limitations in policies "must be carefully scrutinized to determine if they are consistent
with the purposes of the [No-Fault] Act." Steenson, supra note 3, at 348-49.
61. See A. WIDISS, supra note 15, § 5.7, at 274-75; see also Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Lopez,
22 Ariz. App. 309, 310, 526 P.2d 1264, 1265-66 (1974); Harthcock v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 248 So.2d 456, 459-60 (Miss. 1971); Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co. v. Mead, 14
Wash. App. 43, 50, 538 P.2d 865, 867-71 (1975). In Niemann v. Travelers Ins. Co., 368
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Schmidt and Paskoff were deprived of their statutory right to receive
benefits from their optional underinsurance coverage. By not invalidat-
ing consent clauses, the Schmidt court did not resolve a conflict which
may delay or preclude compensation of underinsurance holders.62
A second problem which the Schmidt court did not address was directly
posed in the Paskoffcase. How should the "gap" be handled in the case
of multiple tortfeasors?63 Unfortunately, there are situations in which
prompt payment of underinsurance benefits may prove impossible
through no fault of the underinsurer. For instance, if future decisions
require the insured to collect from each tortfeasor an amount based on
each tortfeasor's comparative fault, 6 4 the underinsurer may be unable to
quickly ascertain the amount of underinsurance benefits payable. 65
An example of this problem is illustrated by the following situation.
The form language recommended by the Insurance Services Office pro-
vides: "We will pay all sums the insured is legally entitled to recover as
So.2d 1003 (La. 1980), the Louisiana court held that consent to settle clauses served no
legally authorized purpose and were, therefore, invalid. Id at 1007. The court asked,
"why should the insurer, mandated by statute to afford [underinsured motorist] coverage
and receiving a premium for exposure over liability limits of the underinsured motorist,
have the right to interfere with its insured's settlement with a liability carrier within policy
limits, and that carrier's insured?" Id One commentator observes that "On balance it
appears that enforcement of these [consent] clauses creates an unwarranted interference
with effectuation of the purpose of the [legislation enacted to protect accident victims]." 2
I. SCHERMER, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE §§ 35.08 [11[a], at 35-39 (1982). The
Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act provides that "the [commissioner] shall
approve only terms and conditions consistent with the purposes of this Act." UNIFORM
MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT REPARATIONS ACT, § 17 (1972). Arguably, such a restric-
tion limiting an insured's right to recovery may not be consistent with the purposes of the
Act.
62. In cases arising subsequent to the repeal of§ 65B.49, subd. 6(e), insureds purchas-
ing underinsurance coverage will lack the protection of specific statutory language. The
court's decision in American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ryan, 330 N.W.2d 113 (Minn. 1983),
exposes the Schmidt court's possible failure. In upholding an exclusion in a homeowner's
policy, the Ryan court stated:
The well-stated general rule in the construction of insurance contracts, however,
provides that parties are free to contract as they desire, and so long as coverage
required by law is not omitted and policy provisions do not contravene applica-
ble statutes, the extent of the insurer's liability is governed by the contract en-
tered into.
Id at 115. A possible negative effect of invalidating consent clauses is that insurers may
respond by raising premiums. Interview with Michael C. Snyder, attorney for respondent
Paskoff, in Minneapolis, Minnesota (June 15, 1984).
63. See 338 N.W.2d at 259-60. Paskoff settled for $22,000 from Hoag's $25,000 policy
limit in addition to $4,000 from Epperly's $300,000 policy limit. This created a $3,000
"gap" from the Hoag settlement and a $296,000 "gap" from the Epperly settlement. The
court required the arbitrator to calculate underinsurance benefits based on the Hoag lim-
its. Id. at 263-64.
64. See UNIFORM MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT REPARATIONS ACT § 38 commis-
sioner comment (1972).
65. Id
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damages from the owner of an underinsured motor vehicle."66 Whether
to allow an injured insured to pursue underinsurance coverage from his
own carrier, when only one of several drivers involved in an accident is
underinsured, appears to be an open question. Under the above clause, a
plaintiff could argue that the policy language "an" means that only one
involved vehicle need be underinsured for the injured insured to proceed
against his own carrier. Conversely, policy language that referred to
"each" underinsured motor vehicle would prohibit claims for underin-
surance benefits unless the amount of damages attributable to the fault
of each involved vehicle exceeded that driver's coverage. At the present
time this issue appears to be strictly a matter of private contract law, as
the Minnesota No-Fault Act provides no guidance.
The issue of how cases involving multiple victims should be handled
was not raised in the Schmidt case. If the insured is required to collect the
amount available from the tortfeasor rather than the tortfeasor's policy
limits, the amount of underinsurance benefits payable will be difficult to
ascertain until all victims' damages are determined, thereby making
prompt payment impossible.6 7
A final remaining question is whether the check substitution procedure
adopted in Schmidt is applicable to uninsured motorist situations. In
Flaneiy v. Total Tree, Inc.,68 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that sub-
rogation is permissible in uninsured motorist cases, but only to the extent
necessary to prevent double recovery.69 The Schmidt court's concern with
an injured insured's incentive to obtain the best possible settlement could
arise in an uninsured motorist situation. 70 If the Schmidt reasoning is ap-
plied the uninsured carrier may have a more meaningful right of
subrogation. 71
The procedure set forth by the Schmidt court should prove beneficial to
injured insureds; clearly, it furthers the public policy favoring complete
and swift compensation of automobile accident victims. 72 The Schmidt
66. Insurance Services Office, Underinsured Motorists Insurance (Minnesota) 1, CA
21 08 (Ed. 04 78) (emphasis added) (policy endorsement) (1978) (on file at William Mitch-
ell Law Review Office).
67. See J. SCHWEBEL, MINNESOTA NO-FAULT UPDATE 30 (1979).
68. 332 N.W.2d 642 (Minn. 1983).
69. Id. at 645. This decision is consistent with uninsured law prior to the No-Fault
Act. See Kluver, 302 Minn. 310, 225 N.W.2d 230 (1974).
70. Once the injured insured has received the benefits from its insurer, he only seeks
compensation from the tortfeasor to the extent of his injuries. If the insurer had paid
$50,000 in benefits and the insured sustained $60,000 in damages, the insured would seek
only $10,000 from the tortfeasor. Even if the tortfeasor had the ability to pay more, the
insured's reparation obligor would not be subrogated since there would have been no
double recovery. See Flanery, 332 N.W.2d at 645.
71. The insurer could substitute its check for the settlement offer and proceed against
the tortfeasor via subrogation. 338 N.W.2d at 263.
72. See supra note 5; f Milbradt v. American Legion Post, 354 N.W.2d 499 (Minn.
App. 1984). Milbradt involved a dram shop action. The court stated: "The prompt pay-
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decision also supports the important public policy that persons should
not be placed in an inferior position because they purchased underin-
surance. 73 Both Schmidt and Paskoff purchased underinsurance as pro-
tection against inadequately insured tortfeasors.74 Both parties were
;ubsequently injured by inadequately insured tortfeasors, but were pre-
.ented from settling with the tortfeasor's liability insurer. 75 If they had
not acquired their underinsurance coverages, their settlements would not
have given rise to their respective conflicts with Safeco. In essence, the
underinsured coverage forced them to litigate their claims and penalized
them for purchasing the purportedly advantageous optional coverage.
76
The Schmidt decision offers a fair and equitable reconciliation of the
conflict between insureds and insurers in underinsurance settlement pro-
ceedings. Although the "gap" may represent a step away from full com-
pensation for automobile accident victims, the protection of insurers'
subrogation interests during settlement is highly valuable to the insur-
ance industry. Ultimately, insureds will be permitted to settle with third
parties without fear of forfeiting their underinsured motorist benefits. At
ment of basic economic loss benefits without regard to fault is at the heart of our no-fault
system." Id at 502. The Mibrad court also cited Schmidt in support of its observation that
"subrogation rights depend on 'general principles of equity and the nature of the contract
of insurance.'" 354 N.W.2d at 501 (citing Schmidt, 338 N.W.2d at 263).
73. Several courts have relied on a similar anomaly in allowing injured parties to
recover under their uninsured motorist endorsement when the tortfeasor carried insur-
ance, but at a level inadequate to compensate the insured in an amount equal to the
minimum insurance required by statute. See, e.g., Porter v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 106 Ariz. 274, 475 P.2d .258 (1970). In Porter, the tortfeasor carried the minimum
coverage of $10,000. Id. at 279, 475 P.2d at 263. Only $2,500, however, was available to
the plaintiff because of compensation to previous claimants. Id. The court held that the
plaintiff was eligible for benefits under his uninsured coverage. Id. A contrary holding
would have placed the insured in the questionable position of being better off had the
tortfeasor not been insured. Id The Supreme Court of Hawaii adopted the Porter court's
reasoning in Palisbo v. Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co., 57 Hawaii 10, 12, 547 P.2d 1350, 1354
(1976).
74. See 338 N.W.2d at 259. According to the Federal District Court for Minnesota,
the purpose of underinsurance is to "afford financial protection to persons who are willing
to pay a premium to assure themselves compensation for damages arising from bodily
injuries inflicted upon them by the negligence of an owner or operator of a vehicle which
is covered by less than adequate insurance." Royer v. Maryland Casualty Co., Civ. No. 5-
78-27 (D. Minn. Feb. 21, 1979).
75. 338 N.W.2d at 259.
76. Forcing insureds to litigate in these circumstances is contrary to the Minnesota
Supreme Court's support for settlement without litigation. See Johnson v. St. Paul Ins.
Cos., 305 N.W.2d 571 (Minn. 1981); Hentschel v. Smith, 278 Minn. 86, 153 N.W.2d 199
(1967); Jallen v. Agre, 264 Minn. 369, 119 N.W.2d 739 (1963). Forcing the insured to
litigate puts the insured in a position which, by analogy, has been prohibited in
mandatory coverages. Under Minnesota Statutes section 65B.53, subd. 6 (1982), no in-
surer "shall include in its contract any provision which would require a person to com-
mence a negligence action as a condition precedent to the payment of basic economic loss
benefits or which permits the reparation obligor to determine whether such an action will
be commenced .... ." Id
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the same time, insurers can protect their subrogation interests by paying
their insureds the settlement amount offered by the tortfeasor. Each
party thus gives up a right while securing a benefit.
Torts-EXCLUSIVE CONTROL UNDER STRICT LIABILITY AND RES IPSA
LOQUITUR-Mahowald v. Minnesota Gas Co., 344 N.W.2d 856 (Minn.
1984).
Natural gas is a major source of energy used in millions of homes and
businesses throughout the United States., Gas is transported to residen-
tial and industrial users through hidden networks of underground, pres-
surized pipelines.2 Although the transmission of natural gas is relatively
safe, when accidents do occur, extensive property damage, personal in-
jury, and even death can result.3 Under such circumstances, the salient
issue is whether negligence or strict liability is the appropriate standard
to impose on the defendant gas distributor.4
I. See 23 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS ANNOTATED Gas Explosions § 2, at 452 (1969).
"At one time manufactured gas was the common utility gas, but a trend developed to
natural gas, which is cleaner and more convenient .... Today natural gas is the major
utility gas in a greatly expanded market." Id.
2. See Note, Liabih'y of Natural Gas Transmission Line Operators.- United States and Cana-
dian Theories of Liability for Gas Transmission Line Accidents, 3 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 455, 455 (1980). In the United States there are 263,000 miles of natural gas trans-
mission pipelines. 10 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., NATURAL GAS PIPELINE SAFETY ACT AN-
NUAL REPORT i (1977) [hereinafter cited as ANNUAL REPORT].
3. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 3 n.1. There were 466 failures involving trans-
mission and gathering lines reported to the Department of Transportation in 1977. Id.
Fewer than 25 deaths occur each year in the United States from natural gas explosions.
Id
4. See generally 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 14.3, at 794 (1956)
(policy basis for liability without fault); W.P. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D.
OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 78, at 545 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinaf-
ter cited as PROSSER & KEETON] (abnormally dangerous things and activities); Coleman,
The Morality of Strict Tort Liability, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 259 (1976) (discussing moral-
ity of strict liability as a tort standard); Feezer, Capacity to Bear Loss as a Factor in the Decision
of Certath Types of Tort Cases, 78 U. PA. L. REV. 805 (1930) (discussing risk allocation as
strong element in case decisions); Samuel, Strict Liabity: Advance, Retreat-or Advancing
Backwards?, 6 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 99 (1977) (analysis of res ipsa loquitur as a tool for
importing strict liability into negligence cases); Fault and Liability. Two Views of Legal Devel-
opment, 31 HARV. L. REV. 954, 966 (1918) (discussing theories of imposing liability without
fault).
Because natural gas is an abnormally dangerous substance and gas distributors are
more capable of cost spreading, courts have been urged to reject the negligence standards
and find distributors strictly liable. See Mahowald v. Minnesota Gas Co., 344 N.W.2d
856, 864-65 (Minn. 1984) (Todd, J., dissenting); New Meadows Holding Co. v. Washing-
ton Water Power Co., 34 Wash. App. 25, 36-40, 659 P.2d 1113, 1119-21 (1983) (Mclnturff,
J., dissenting), noted in Mahowald, 344 N.W.2d at 861-62.
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